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TESTING THE OVER- AND UNDER-EXPLOITATION HYPOTHESES:
BESTSELLING MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS (1913-32) AND THEIR USE IN
CINEMA (1968-2007)
Paul J. Heald*
Abstract

Some economists assert that as valuable works transition from
copyrighted status and fall into the public domain they will be
underexploited and their value dissipated. Others insist instead that
without an owner to control their use, valuable public domain works
will be overexploited or otherwise debased. This study of the most
valuable musical compositions from 1913-32 demonstrates that
neither hypothesis is true as it applies to the exploitation of songs in
movies from 1968-2007. When compositions fall into the public
domain, they are just as likely to be exploited in movies, suggesting
no under-exploitation. And the rate of exploitation of these public
domain songs is no greater than that of copyrighted songs,
indicating no congestion externality. The absence of market failure
is likely due to producer and consumer self-regulation.
A growing group of commentators assert that the public may suffer when valuable
copyrighted works fall into the public domain. One concern is under-exploitation, the
possibility that a work without an owner will not be adequately distributed or otherwise
made available to the public. According to Landes and Posner, “[A]n absence of
copyright protection for intangible works may lead to inefficiencies because . . . of
impaired incentives to invest in maintaining and exploiting these works.”1 Congress,2 the

*Visiting Professor of Law, University of Chicago; Allen Post Professor of Law,
University of Georgia; Visiting Professor, Centre for Intellectual Property Policy and
Management, Bournemouth University. Thanks to Liz Wheeler for her work as my research
assistant, to Doug Baird, Barton Beebe, Justin Hughes, Jay Kesan, Stan Liebowitz, Kirk Willis,
and to participants at workshops at the University of Chicago, Case Western University, ChicagoKent Law School, Bournemouth University, Birkbeck College, the Conference on Empirical
Legal Studies, and the World Intellectual Property Organization, Geneva. Thanks also to Kun Xu
and Professor Jaxk Reeves of the Statistics Department of the University of Georgia who
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courts,3 and the Copyright Office4 all cited this concern in support of recent copyright
term extension legislation.5 As to popular novels, at least, worries of under-exploitation
appear to be unfounded. A recent empirical study of bestselling fiction from 1913-32
demonstrates that from 1988-2001, famous public domain novels were as available as
their copyrighted counterparts.6
A different, and until now empirically untested, claim asserts that a popular work
falling into the public domain may be overexploited, “overgrazed” to use the terminology
found in the tragedy-of-the-commons literature.7 Landes and Posner assert that the value
of “a novel or a movie or a comic book character or a piece of music or a painting” could
be depleted in much the same way as “unlimited drilling from a common pool of oil or
gas would deplete the pool prematurely.”8 Others suggest that the value of ownerless

1

William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 471, 475 (2003).
2
Congress found in 1998 that retroactive extension of protection to existing works
nonetheless “would provide copyright owners generally with the incentive to restore older works
and further disseminate them to the public.” H.R. Rep. No. 105-452, p. 4 (1998).
3
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 207 (2002) (Congress “rationally credited projections
that longer terms would encourage copyright holders to invest in the restoration and public
distribution of their works”); Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.2d 372, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff’d as Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (arguing that works falling into the public domain will be less
available to the public).
4
See Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearings on HR
989, HR 1248 and HR 1734 before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 1st Sess 50, 161, 171, 188 (statement of Marybeth
Peters, Register of Copyrights) (arguing that publishers will not risk investing in a work that they
do not own and therefore term extension is needed to assure availability of works).
5
See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
6
See Paul J. Heald, Property Rights and the Efficient Exploitation of Copyrighted Works:
An Empirical Analysis of Public Domain and Copyrighted Fiction Best Sellers, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 1031 (2008). (comparing 166 public domain best sellers from 1913-22 with 167
copyrighted best sellers from 1923-32 and also comparing the twenty most enduringly popular
works from each group).
7
See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (arguing
that real property that lacks an owner will be overused and its value degraded).
8
Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 487.
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works could be dissipated through excessive or inappropriate uses.9 In response, Mark
Lemley has argued that “this justification for intellectual property depends on proof that
there is in fact a tragedy of the commons for information.”10 Since proponents of the
under- and over-exploitation theories have done little testing of their hypotheses, the
present study fills a significant gap in the literature.
Lemley identifies both the under-exploitation and the overexploitation arguments
as “ex post” justifications for protecting works in that they provide a rationale for
extending protection without reference to “ex ante” incentives to create.11 The ex post
justifications outlined above stand in the forefront of the world-wide debate over whether
copyright terms for existing works should be retroactively extended.12 Because the
standard incentive-to-create rationale cannot justify extending the term of protection for a
9

See Stan Liebowitz and Stephen Margolis, Seventeen Famous Economists Weigh in on
Copyright: The Role of Theory, Empirics, and Network Effects, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for
Reg. Studies 2 (Jan. 2004) (noting “the possibility of network effects in the market for derivative
works that might make a copyright commons uneconomic”); Lee Ann Fennell, Common Interest
Tragedies, 98 Nw. L. Rev. 907, 918 (2004) (“Intellectual goods exhibit “nonrivalry” in
consumption, insofar as the transmission of a song or theory from me to you does not leave any
less of the song or theory for me. Nevertheless, these goods are subject to a form of overgrazing,
insofar as consumers have limited attention.”); Michael Steven Green, Copyrighting Facts, 78
Ind. L. J. 919 (2003) (“In addition to encouraging authors to create new works, copyrights also
encourage authors to efficiently utilize constituents of works that already exist. For example, if no
one had a property right in the character Superman, authors could freely create works in which
Superman appeared as a character without concern for the effect their works had on the value of
actual and potential Superman-based works.”); Alex Kozinski, Mickey and Me, 11 U. MIAMI
ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 465 (1994) (unauthorized uses “end[ ] up diminishing the value of the
product, not just to the creator, but to the general public”). Cf. Justin Hughes, "Recoding”
Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 923, 926 (1999) (“nonowners commonly benefit from owner control that is used to keep a cultural object ‘stable.’”).
10
Mark Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 129, 143 (2004).
11
See id. at 129-31.
12
See, for example, Gowers Review of Intellectual Property at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/gowers_review_intellectual_property/gowersreview_index.
cfm (study commissioned by the British Treasury department rejecting ex post justifications for
extending copyright protection for existing works). Japan is also considering retroactive term
extension. See http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2007/11/japan-looks-at-copyright-term-extension. html. The author recently presented his findings on the exploitation of bestselling public
domain fiction in Tokyo. See http://www.21coe-win-cls.org/english/info/index.html
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work that already exists,13 ex post justifications are also likely to drive the debate over
further extensions in the U.S. when the present 20-year extension runs out in 2018.
Claims of inefficient exploitation of public domain works have already been relied upon
heavily by the successful apologists for the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act.14
Neither the over- nor under-exploitation theories have gone unchallenged. Lemley
scoffs at under-exploitation worries, stating that the claim “that control by a single firm is
necessary to induce efficient production [is] theoretically unsound”15 and wondering why
there is “some greater need to subsidize [by granting exclusive rights] the making of
more copies of Ulysses than the making of more paper clips.”16 Amicus briefs,17
including one signed by five Nobel Laureate economists,18 rejected the underexploitation argument when it was made in Eldred v. Ashcroft, and my own empirical
work concludes that popular books falling into the public domain are not underexploited
in comparison to their copyrighted counterparts.19 The over-exploitation theory has also
come under attack.20 Richard Epstein is a doubter, suggesting that “[a]nyone is hard
pressed to believe that Shakespeare's star has been dimmed by the calamities committed

13

See Lemley, supra note 10, at 133-34 (“Congress could obviously not justify
retroactive extension on the ground that it would encourage dead people to produce more
works.”); Heald, supra note 6, at 1032.
14
See supra notes 1-4.
15
See Lemley, supra note 10, at 138.
16
Id. at 136.
17
See, for example, Brief of Amici Curiae The Internet Archive, Prelinger Archives, and
Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation in Support of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No.
01-618 (S Ct filed May, 2002) (available on Westlaw at 2002 WL 1059714) (showing that in
2002 more of the total number of books published in 1920 were in print than those published in
1930).
18
See Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in support of Petitioners, Eldred
v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 (S Ct filed May, 2002) (available on Westlaw at 2002 WL 1041846).
19
See Heald, supra note 6.
20
See Laura Bradford, Parody and Perception: Using Cognitive Research to Expand the
Fair Use Exception in Copyright Law, 46 B.C.L. Rev. 706, 707 (2005) (“Academic critiques of
using an overgrazing doctrine for intellectual property are widespread.”).
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in his name . . .”21 So too Lemley and Dennis Karjala, both of whom deploy marketbased economic arguments to allay fears of a congestion externality caused by overuse of
copyrighted works.22 They conclude that “a belief that the original creator (or his
transferee) can best manage the work in the public interest runs strongly contrary to our
long-standing and fundamental reliance on free markets to allocate resources to the
production and distribution of goods.”23
Although the theoretical arguments on both sides are interesting, commentators
have so far assumed (but not necessarily believed) that works falling into the public
domain will be exploited at a different rate than their copyrighted counterparts.
Exploitation rates are, of course, observable and ripe for empirical analysis. In Part I of
the article, I explain the methodology of my study of popular musical compositions from
1913-32 as they appear in movies from 1968-2007. The study tracks songs from 1913-22
as they fall into the public domain and compares changes in exploitation rates with songs
from 1923-32 that are still protected by copyright.
Studying musical compositions has several advantages over my prior study of
best-selling books. First, tracking the appearance of compositions in movies provides
data on the exploitation of derivative works.24 Musical compositions usually appear in
movies as works realized by someone other than the copyright owner. In a movie we hear

21

Richard Epstein, Liberty v. Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright Law, 42
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 26 (2005).
22
See Lemley, supra note 10; Dennis Karjala, Congestion Externalities and Extended
Copyright Protection, 94 GEO. L. J. 1065 (2006).
23
See Karjala, supra note 22, at 1079, citing Lemley, supra note 10 at ___.
24
See 17 U.S.C. § 100 (defining a derivative work as one “based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a . . . sound recording . . . or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted.”); 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (authors’ rights include the exclusive right
to prepare derivative works).
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a recording of the composition, a derivative work under the Copyright Act.25 Since those
worried about over-exploitation inevitably warn against unauthorized derivative works as
their most serious potential concern,26 the study provides especially relevant data.
Second, relying on the appearance of musical compositions in movies provides an
alternative, and possibly superior, measure of availability than the counting of book
editions and book publishers in my prior study.27 Therefore, the present study’s finding of
no under-exploitation is not merely duplicative.
In Part II, the results of the study are reported: Public domain songs are exploited
at statistically the same rate as copyrighted songs, indicating that in this context worries
of both over- and under-exploitation are misplaced. Part III joins the theoretical debate
and suggests why self-regulation by both producers and consumers of copyrighted works
explains the lack of market failure. Two novel tests are offered to predict unusual cases
when over- or under-exploitation might be legitimate concerns.
I. METHODOLOGY
Previous studies confirm that most copyrighted works do not hold their value over
time. Landes and Posner note that “fewer than 11 percent of the copyrights registered
between 1883 and 1964 were renewed at the end of their 28-year term, even though the
cost of renewal was small.”28 They point out that of 10,027 books published in the U.S. in

25

See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
All of the sources listed in footnote nine rely primarily on concerns over the creation of
unauthorized derivative works.
27
The study measured availability of public domain books listed in Books In Print and
tracked the number of editions and publishers. These figures were used as proxy for more direct
measures, such as sales figures (which are usually proprietary) or a nationwide survey of
availability in book stores. See Heald, supra note 6, at 1040.
28
Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 473.
26
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1930, only 1.7 percent remained in print in 2001.29 An amicus brief in Eldred v. Ashcroft
put the figure for books published in 1930 even lower, at 1.3 percent.30 Even those
worried about what happens when works fall into the public domain agree that there is
little reason to extend copyright protection to works with no current value.31 In fact,
extending copyright for those works would entail significant tracing and transaction costs
and would almost certainly be inefficient.32 Given this consensus, the present study
identified the 1294 most popular musical compositions from 1913-32 and focuses on the
74 most enduringly valuable of those compositions as they appeared in movies from
1968-2007. The years 1968-2007 were chosen because the compositions from 1913-22
began to fall into the public domain in 1988, the mid-point in that timeline.
Compositions from 1913-1932 were chosen because the works published from
1913-22 are all in the public domain and properly renewed works published from 19231932 are all still protected by copyright as a result of the 1998 Copyright Term Extension
Act,33 allowing for a basically symmetrical comparison of ten years’ worth of works from
each group. Until extension, the effective copyright term for these works was 75 years, so
works from 1913 fell into the public domain in 1988, works from 1914 in fell into the
public domain in 1989, and so on until the 1998 legislation ended the flow of works into
the public domain.34

29

See id. at 474.
See Brief of Amici Curiae The Internet Archive, Prelinger Archives, and Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation in Support of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618,
n. 10 (S Ct filed May 2002) (Available on Westlaw at 2002 WL 1059714) (reporting 180 books
out of 13,470 published in 1930 were “currently available for sale.”).
31
See Landes and Poster, supra note 1, at 474.
32
See id. at 478-480.
33
See 17 U.S.C. § 301. The extension only applied to works that had been properly
renewed in their 28 year after publication under the 1909 Act.
34
See Julie Cohen, et al, COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY
30
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Studying a group of works from approximately the same era provides the
opportunity to compare what happened to works from 1913-22 after they fell into the
public domain and to compare rates of exploitation with those works from 1923-32 that
remained protected. The initial data set included 601 of the most popular compositions
from 1913-22 and 693 of the most popular compositions from 1923-32, as listed in the
most accepted compilation of popular historical musical compositions.35 All of these
songs were then tracked in the Internet Movie Database (www.imdb.com) movie
soundtrack database, which contains comprehensive information on almost 380,000
movies.36 Since the present debate revolves around only those works that have substantial
present value, the primary statistical analysis was performed on the 74 musical
compositions that appeared in at least four movies from 1968-2007 (although the findings
hold for the entire population of compositions37). Since current sales data or licensing
information of historic compositions is mostly proprietary and unavailable, appearance in
movies serves as a proxy for present popularity. Movie producers invest significant
resources into choosing music for their soundtracks. Their goal is to please audiences.
Observing their choices provides an objective and neutral indication of what historic
music presently has value to consumers.
The full list of 1294 songs can be obtained from the author; the subset of 74
appears in Appendix A. A substantial majority of the compositions (44 out of 70) were
published in the six-year period from 1926-31, indicating the significance of the golden
153-56 (2006).
35
See Julius Mattfield, VARIETY MUSIC CAVALCADE: 1620-1961, A
CHRONOLOGY OF VOCAL AND INSTRUMENTAL MUSIC POPULAR IN THE UNITED
STATES (1962).
36
See http://www.imdb.com/database_statistics (listing 379,871 titles) (last visited on
September 5, 2008).
37
See Appendix B (providing full statistical analysis).
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age of Tin Pan Alley,38 an extraordinary time period which marked the publication of
many enduringly familiar works like “Bye Bye Blackbird,” “Blue Skies [Smiling at
Me],” “My Blue Heaven,” “Let’s Do It [Let’s Fall in Love],” “Let’s Misbehave,” “When
You’re Smiling [The Whole World Smiles with You],” “Bolero,” “Happy Days Are Here
Again,” “Singin’ in the Rain,” “Stardust,” “Embraceable You,” “Georgia on My Mind,”
“Get Happy,” “I’ve Got Rythym,” “Just a Gigolo,” and “Mood Indigo.”39 During this
time, Cole Porter, the Gershwin Brothers, Harold Arlen, Hoagy Carmichael, Duke
Ellington, and many others were at the prime of their famous composing careers. Since
only 15 of the compositions dated from the 1913-22 time period, four qualifying songs
from 1909-12 augment that portion of the data.40
The public domain songs were tracked during the period they were protected by
copyright law and then after they fell into the public domain, 75 years after publication.
For example, “Danny Boy,”41 was first published in 1913 and entered the public domain
in 1988. So, its use in movies from 1968 through 1987 (twenty years) when it was
protected by copyright was tracked separately from its use in movies from 1988 through
38

See Phillip Furia, THE POETS OF TIN PAN ALLEY: A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S
GREAT LYRICISTS (1990); David A. Jasen, TIN PAN ALLEY: THE COMPOSERS, THE
SONGS, THE PERFORMERS AND THEIR TIMES (1988).
39
Mort Dixon and Ray Henderson, Bye Bye Blackbird (1926); Irving Berlin, Blue Skies
(1927); George Whiting and Walter Donaldson, My Blue Heaven (1927); Cole Porter, Let’s Do It
(1928); Cole Porter, Let’s Misbehave (1928); Mark Fisher, Joe Goodwin, and Larry Shay, When
You’re Smiling (1928); Maurice Ravel, Bolero (1929); Jack Yellen and Milton Ager, Happy Days
Are Here Again (1929); Arthur Reed and Nacio H. Brown, Singin’ in the Rain (1929); Mitchell
Parrish and Hoagy Carmichael, Stardust (1929); Ira Gershwin and George Gershwin,
Embraceable You (1930); Stuart Gorrell and Hoagy Carmichael, Georgia on My Mind (1930);
Ted Kohler and Harold Arlen, Get Happy (1930); Ira Gershwin and George Gershwin, I’ve Got
Rythym (1930); Irving Caesar and Leonello Casucci, Just a Gigolo (1930); and Duke Ellington,
Irving Mills, and Albany Bigard, Mood Indigo (1931).
40
Those that appeared in at least four movies from 1968-2007. They are: By the Light of
the Silvery Moon (1909); Let Me Call You Sweetheart (1910); Alexander’s Ragtime Band (1911);
and It’s a Long Way to Tipperary (1912).
41
Fredrick Weatherly, Danny Boy (1915). See also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki /Danny_
Boy.
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2007 (twenty years) when it was in the public domain. Compositions from 1914 were
therefore tracked from 1968-1988 (twenty-one years) and then from 1989-2007 (nineteen
years), and so on.
In order to make the graphic comparison seen in Figure 1, each year’s worth of
compositions from the public domain song set were matched with the corresponding year
a decade later in the copyrighted song set. Compositions from 1913 were paired with
1923, 1914 were paired with 1924, and so on. For example, three songs from 1913
appeared in a total of four movies from 1968-1987 (a rate of 4/60), before the songs fell
into the public domain. Those same three songs appeared in 20 movies from 1988-2007
(a rate of 20/60).42 Therefore, the single song in the data set of copyrighted songs from
1923 was also measured in the same time frame, counting its use in movies from 19681987 (denominated “period one”) and then from 1988-2007 (denominated “period two”).
The song, “Bugle Call Rag,” appeared in no movies from 1968-87 (a rate of 0/20) and in
four movies from 1988-2007 (rate of 4/20). For songs from 1914 and 1923, the relevant
time periods for measuring uses in movies was 1968-1988 (period one) and 1989-2007
(period two); for songs from 1915 and 1925, from 1968-89 (period one) and 1990-2007
(period two), and so on.
The aggregate number of uses in movies of the 1913-22 songs during the period
they were still under copyright was compared to the aggregate number of uses of the
1923-32 songs in time period one. Then, the aggregate number of uses in movies of the
1913-22 songs after they fell into the public domain was compared with the aggregate
number of uses of the 1923-32 songs in time period two. This comparison allows for a
42

The rate is 4/60 and 20/60 rather than 4/20 and 20/20 because each of the three songs
was measured during a twenty-year time period, a total of sixty measurable song years (three
songs x twenty years = sixty song years).
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straightforward explanation of the formal statistical regressions presented in Appendix B
which employ a more robust, but less narratively engaging, methodology.
II. DATA ANALYSIS
The goal of the analysis was to answer two questions. First, when compositions
from 1913-22 fell into the public domain were they exploited at a significantly different
rate than while they were still protected by copyright? Second, if the rate of exploitation
of public domain works increased after they fell into the public domain, did the change
indicate signs of over-exploitation in comparison to the rate of exploitation?
A. No Evidence of Under-Exploitation
Before the compositions from 1913-22 fell into the public domain, they appeared
in movies on average at a rate of once every 15.3 years. After they fell into the public
domain, they appeared in movies on average at a rate of once every 3.8 years. At first
glance, this rate change appears to show a significant increase in exploitation, but the rate
change must be compared to the rate of uses of copyrighted songs during the same time
period. After all, all songs from this general era, regardless of their legal status, may be
appearing more frequently in recent movies. This, in fact, appears to be the case. During
the same comparative time periods, the rate at which copyrighted songs from 1923-32
appear in movies increased from once every 7.8 years in time period one to once every
3.3 years in time period two. The following graph shows the comparative increase in
terms of average yearly use of a song in a movie, an increase for public domain songs
from .065 uses per year to .263 uses per year and an increase for copyrighted songs of
from .128 uses per year to .304.
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Figure 1

AVERAGE YEARLY USE OF A SONG IN A MOVIE
0.35

0.3

0.25
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0.2
Time Period 1
Time Period 2
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0.1
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0
Public Domain Songs

Copyrighted Songs

Since the songs from 1913-22 fell into the public domain, they have been used on
average four times more frequently in movies. The songs from 1923-32 also appear more
frequently in movies over the same time period. The change, however, is more modest,
an increase of a little less than two and one-half times as frequently. The formal statistical
regressions in Appendix B, not surprisingly, demonstrate that the transition from
protected work to unprotected work did not render public domain compositions underexploited in relation to works that remained protected by copyright. Public domain songs
from this era do not become orphans that are unavailable for public consumption.
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This result is generally consistent with my prior study of bestselling fiction from
the same period.43 That research compared the 166 bestselling novels from 1913-22 with
the 167 bestselling novels from 1923-32 and found that from 1988-2001, novels in the
public domain were in print at a rate insignificantly different from novels still under
copyright.44 After 2001, however, the public domain novels were in print at a
significantly higher rate, with significantly more editions per novel.45 In 2006, the inprint rate for the public domain novels was 98% as compared to 74% for the copyrighted
novels.46 A comparison of the sub-sets of the twenty most enduringly popular novels
generated similar results.47
Although the music composition data show no evidence of under-exploitation, the
study does not prove a positive public domain effect on availability, like that
demonstrated for public domain books after 2001. A superficial comparison of the rate
changes for music exploitation looks significant (4x as compared to 2.5x), but the logistic
regressions performed in Appendix B expose the confounding effect of time as a variable
and show that the comparative rates of exploitation of public domain and copyrighted
music are not significantly different.
Why is there a positive public domain effect with books, but not with musical
compositions as they appear in film? One difference may be that the study of best-selling
fiction measured the availability of copies of an original work. The costs of scanning a
book into a computer, printing it, and selling it are quite low; many Dover versions of

43

See Heald, supra note 6, at 1040-43.
Id. at 1040.
45
Id. at 1041.
46
Id. at 1040.
47
Id. at 1044-45.
44
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bestselling classics sell for less than four dollars.48 If one chooses to publish a
copyrighted book instead of a public domain book, the additional licensing cost will have
a significant effect on the overall cost of production. On the other hand, the proportional
cost savings of choosing a public domain song for a movie is likely to be much lower.
Because a musical composition, whether it is protected by copyright or not, can only
appear in a movie as a derivative work, the director of the film must either hire musicians
or singers (or both) in order to realize a version of the composition, or she must obtain a
license to use an existing recording of the composition. Creating the derivative work from
“scratch” will likely entail significant costs, and the alternative of using an existing
recording will likely entail the payment of a significant licensing fee to the owner of the
recording. These costs will be incurred even if the underlying musical composition is in
the public domain.49
Using a musical composition in a movie, therefore, is likely to be significantly
more expensive than copying a book because it entails the creation of a new derivative
work or the purchasing of a license to use one created by someone else. A film director
can save some money by telling her musical director to choose only public domain
compositions for the score, but the savings will be proportionally smaller than those
enjoyed by the book publisher. Because of the marginal savings of choosing public
domain music, it is not surprising that compositions are not exploited at a rate
significantly exceeding that of protected music.50

48

See amazon.com (advanced book search under “publisher/Dover” and
“subject/literature and fiction”).
49
Sound recordings of public domain compositions are independently protectable under
17 U.S.C. 106(7). Compare 106(2) (establishing separate protection for musical compositions).
50
They are exploited at a higher rate, but the difference is not significant. See Appendix
B.
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B. No Evidence of Over-Exploitation
Two sorts of over-exploitation arguments have been offered by those who worry
about what happens to works when they fall into the public domain. First, works may
simply be overused and worn out, like a song we have heard so frequently we do not
want to hear it again. Second, inappropriate uses, even if infrequent, may “recode” the
original meaning of a work,51 debase it or otherwise make it less valuable to consumers.
The examples most frequently given involve uses of copyrighted fictional characters in
new pornographic works.52
1. No Evidence of Worn-Out Songs
As noted earlier each song in the public domain data set on average appears in a
movie once every 3.8 years; each song in the copyrighted data set on average appears in a
movie once every 3.3 years. Appendix B shows that these rates are statistically the same.
This result makes it very difficult to argue that these songs need owners in order to
prevent them from being worn out and devalued. If copyright owners are willing to
license their compositions at a higher rate than public domain compositions are used, then
the evidence against over-exploitation seems conclusive.
Even the most intense periods of usage of the public domain songs, Danny Boy
(1913), with nine movie appearances between 1993 and 2001 and After You’ve Gone
(1918), with nine movie appearances between 1996 and 2006, do not outstrip the periods
of most intense usage for compositions protected by copyright. For example, in the
1930’s, Sweet Georgia Brown (1925) appeared in 15 movies, Am I Blue? (1929) in 17
movies, and Happy Days Are Here Again (1929) in 34 movies. More recently, the Irving
51

See Hughes, supra note 9, at 923-26.
See Liebowitz, supra note 9, at 5-6 (speculating about porno tales involving Dr.
Seuss’s character the Grinch).
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Berlin classic Blues Skies (1927) appeared in 10 movies from 1994-2004; Stardust (1929)
appeared in 10 movies in the 1990’s; and Dream a Little Dream of Me (1931) appeared in
10 movies from 1995-2005. Copyright owners seem to be willing to license their
compositions at rates equal to or exceeding that of the most intensely used public domain
compositions. When a song falls into the public domain, the data provide no evidence
that it will be overexploited and worn out by moviemakers.
2. Debased Works?
Even if a song is not subject to overly frequent use, some worry that a handful of
“inappropriate” uses might debase the value of the original work, rendering it less
desirable for consumption. If public domain songs have been subjected to damaging uses,
therefore, one would expect them to be used less frequently in movies thereafter. After
all, a rational film director would not want to alienate her audiences with a composition
that had been previously debased. Evidence of debasement should show up in decreasing
demand for public domain music over time as compared to copyrighted music from the
same era. The data as a whole show no evidence of this, but the number of movie uses in
any particular year is too small to measure accurately whether any particular public
domain song has been damaged, damage that might be masked by its inclusion in the
larger set of songs.
Evidence from my previous study of bestselling fiction, however, provides some
interesting evidence on individual works. At Year 75 after publication, the twenty most
enduring popular works from 1913-22 were in print at an average of 4.7 editions per
title.53 At Year 80 after publication, the average is 9 editions per title, and at year 85 it
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See Appendix C (previously unpublished data).
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rises to 13.4 editions per title.54 By the year 2006, an average of 26.6 editions per title are
in print.55 The data demonstrate no evidence that pervasive inappropriate uses have
reduced the attractiveness of the works for production and delivery to the public. The
story is the same when one looks at the individual titles. Eighteen of the twenty titles
were in print in more editions in Year 80 after publication than in Year 75.56 All twenty
experienced an increase from Year 80 after publication to Year 85, and all twenty
experienced an increase in the number of available editions from Year 85 after
publication to the year 2006.57 Moreover, the steepness of the upward sloping curve of
editions exceeds that of copyrighted works from the same era over the same periods.58
This is not to assert, of course, that there have been no shocking uses of either the songs
or the books studied. As discussed below, producer and consumer self-regulation may
explain why works are likely safe from even pornographic uses.
III. THE EFFICIENT EXPLOITATION DEBATE
Given the lack of empirical support, the persistence of claims that value is
dissipated when works fall into the public domain seems curious. In this final section, I
explore the paradigmatic examples of inefficient exploitation that have been offered and
suggest a test to identify when problems might occur. Previous skeptics have argued that
even if value is dissipated, we should not worry when it results from the natural
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interaction of market forces.59 I explore below why value may be unlikely to be
dissipated at all when works fall into the public domain.
A. Under-Exploitation
In my previous work, I identified three conditions that might justify extending
copyright protection to an existing work in order to prevent its under-exploitation: 1) The
cost of making the initial copy of a work available to the public is high; 2) the cost to free
riders of making subsequent copies is low; and 3) the newly available work does not
incorporate independently protectable material.60 The test had its genesis in arguments
over whether old public domain films needed owners in order to ensure their preservation
and distribution.61 If an old film requires a significant expenditure to repair and yet could
easily be copied and distributed without authorization once it is in digital form, the owner
of the physical copy of the film may lack an adequate financial incentive to restore the
film. The above test builds on this seemingly sensible intuition about a narrow category
of works that might require owners to ensure their availability. Given the reality
surrounding aging films, which may be more efficiently husbanded by non-owners,62 we
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See Karjala, supra note 22, at 1072 (criticizing Landes and Posner and arguing that “A
change in the demand curve for a work, however, while showing a change in how much society
values a particular work relative to whatever else is available, says nothing about the total value
to society of all the goods and services available.”) Karjala notes that if the public’s taste for
buggies shifts to cars then “[b]uggies are indeed less valuable, but society has incurred no
economic loss.” Id. Mark Lemley notes that competition changes consumption patterns with
durable goods and should also with creative goods formerly protected by copyright. See Lemley,
supra note 10, at 135-6 (“Our normal supposition is that the invisible hand of the market will
work by permitting different companies to compete with each other [to produce a good the public
wants].”). Cf. Heald, supra note 6, at 1054 (“If we trust the market to produce the optimal amount
of tangible goods like string, bubble gum, and diet soda without entrusting central control of
those products to a single authority, why should we treat intangible public goods like My Antonia,
the color yellow, or the word “coffee” any differently””).
60
Heald, supra note 6, at 1052-53.
61
See Lemley, supra note 10, at 134 & fn.16 (collecting sources).
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See id. at 137 & fn.27, citing Deirdre K. Mulligan and Jason M. Schultz, Neglecting the
National Memory: How Copyright Term Extensions Compromise the Development of Digital

18

should add a fourth proviso: 4) owners are in fact more willing than non-owners to
preserve and distribute. This new fourth condition finds support in a recent study
undertaken by the Library of Congress that shows non-owners have been making historic
sound recordings available in digital form at a higher rate than their owners.63
Where the four conditions are met, perhaps we should be worried, but it seems
clear that they are generally not met with respect to the vast majority of books, music,
films or computer programs and other works that are cheap and easy to produce.64 In
general, the copyright term seems adequate if it is long enough to stimulate the creation
of the work in the first instance. Extra extension, like that found in the Copyright Term
Extension Act, is probably not justified except in a tiny fraction of cases. In the absence
of these four conditions, we should not expect to see problems with under-exploitation
when a work falls into the public domain.
Applying the test to musical compositions as they appear in movies helps explain
why we see no under-exploitation with these works As noted above, a musical
composition as it appears in a movie is a derivative work that may be quite costly for the
music director to use and thereby make available in a new form to the public.65 Unlike
with the making a copy of a book, the first condition arguing in favor of ownership may

Archives, 4 J APP PRAC & PROCESS 451, 472 (2002) (“According to the Internet Movie
Database, 36,386 motion picture titles were released from 1927 to 1946. Of those, only 2,480 are
currently available on videotape; only 871 are available on DVD; only 114 are available on PayPer-View/TV; and only thirteen are available in theaters.”). Lemley notes, “By contrast, just one
archive--the Prelinger Archive--has over 27,000 public domain films and has put more than 1,100
online. See Rick Prelinger, Prelinger Archives, online at http:// www.prelinger.com.” Id.
63
See Tim Brooks, Survey of Reissues of U.S. Recording, Council on Library and
Information Resources (2004) (copyright owers have made only 14% of popular recording from
1890-1964 available on CD, while non-owners have made 22% of them available to the public on
CD).
64
See Heald, supra note 6, at 1051-53.
65
See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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often be met. Condition two is also probably met: if the movie is in a digital format, it
will be quite easy to copy. Condition three, however, is not met, and songs in movies
provide a nice example of the salience of that condition. A musical composition as it
abides in a soundtrack is surrounded by independently protected work, like the script, the
cinematography, and the sound recording itself, whose copyright is owned by its
producer. The musical composition per se, the sheet music, cannot be easily extracted
without offending the rights of copyright owners of neighboring works. The realization of
the old public domain work within a new protected format means that the filmmaker has
few real worries about competitors free riding its labor. In other words, the public domain
status of the underlying musical composition should not pose a threat to its continued
exploitation, precisely what the data analyzed above shows.
B. Overexploitation: Worn Out Works and Inappropriate Uses
Trademark law provides a nice example of how both sorts of overexploitation
fears discussed in Part II become operationalized in law. One of the primary bases, for
example, for the enactment of the Federal Trademark Anti-Dilution Act66 was the fear
that unauthorized uses of a trademark would blur its ability to identify the source of its
owner’s goods or services. Even if a new “KODAK Café” or “EXXON Telephone” were
of impeccable quality, Congress feared that a proliferation of uses would render marks
like KODAK or EXXON less able to call to mind their original owners. Overuse might
literally wear out the marks. I am currently collecting data on whether such unauthorized
uses actually occurred prior to anti-dilution protection, but there is little doubt that the
“wearing out” theory motivated Congress to pass the law in 1988.67
66
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15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
See Gerard N. Magliocca, One and Inseparable: Dilution and Infringement in
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On the other hand, traditional trademark infringement provides a good example
of how inappropriate uses can directly alter, as opposed to just wear out, the meaning of a
symbol.68 In fact, accountants routinely testify about the amount of pecuniary damage
done to the value of a trademark when consumers are confused by an infringer.69 If a
garment maker sells shirts under the trademark “EXCELSIOR” and establishes a
reputation for a high quality product, a subsequent user of the trademark on inferior
goods will not only lower the trademark’s value to the garment maker, but also make the
word “EXCELSIOR” less usable to the public. Before the infringement, “EXCELSIOR”
meant high quality shirts; afterwards it does not. If consumers are successfully confused
by an infringer, then the public has been robbed of a valuable mnemonic device. The
mark is debased.
Given the data presented in Part II, we need to ask why these two concerns might
not have the same traction in the context of copyrighted works.
1. Worn Out Songs? Worn Out Anything?
As noted in Part II, each of the most popular public domain songs from 1913-22
appears in movies at statistically the same rate. At least in the context of musical
compositions in movies, there appears to be no chance that public domain songs are
wearing out at a higher rate than their copyrighted counterparts. But what about songs as
they are heard on the radio or in television advertising? Is it possible that public domain
songs are being worn out via overexposure in non-movie media?

Trademark Law, 85 MINN. L. REV. 949, 975-82 (2001).
68
The cause of action for dilution via tarnishment of a mark’s image is designed to
protect a mark from altered meanings. See 35 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
69
See Gordon V. Smith, Trademark Valuation (1997).
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Landes and Posner,70 and Liebowitz and Margolis71 recognize that congestion
externalities usually are not thought to be a problem with works, like those typically
protected by copyright law, which have the characteristics of non-rivalrousness and
inexhaustibility. They understand that a song can be sung by one or two or one thousand
people at the same time (demonstrating non-rivalrousness), over and over again, day after
day, without wearing the song out (demonstrating inexhaustibility). Since the marginal
cost imposed by each additional user is zero, limiting access would result in a deadweight
loss. In fact, if one defines the value of a good in terms of its continued usability, then
overuse is theoretically impossible with pure public goods. Landes and Posner, and
Liebowitz and Margolis, however, argue that the relevant measure of value is market
value, not usability, and therefore posit that certain sorts of marginal additional uses of a
public good may impose positive costs. For example, if dozens of advertisers all chose
the same song to market their products on television, the public might tire of the tune, and
demand for it would drop, reducing its market value. We might, they speculate, see a
musical version of the tragedy of the commons.
With songs, this eventuality seems unlikely. First, the vast majority of media
airplay occurs through the broadcaster’s acquisition of an ASCAP license. The standard
license in no way restricts the number of times a song can be broadcast over any period
of time.72 In other words, copyright owners, acting through their primary agent, the
American Society of Composers and Authors and Publishers, seem utterly uninterested in
limiting the airplay of their compositions. Broadcasters, not copyright owners, determine
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how frequently the public should hear a song. Presumably, broadcasters voluntarily
choose not to overplay a song for fear of alienating the public or reducing the value of a
good they would like to offer in the future. Overplaying a musical composition, whether
it is copyrighted or in the public domain, is bad business, a fact that copyright owners
seem to recognize by not restraining broadcasters. In the broadcasting context, public
domain songs seem no more likely to be worn out, therefore, than copyrighted songs. It
seems specious, at least as to broadcasting, to argue that each song needs an owner to
limit its use.
That leaves “background” music used in advertising, in films, and on television
which is not licensed through ASCAP.73 My data cast doubt on overuse of public domain
music in movies, and over-exploitation seems unlikely in other contexts also. With a
virtually infinite commons of music to choose from, advertisers are unlikely to risk
alienating the public by choosing the same theme music as too many of their peers.
Decades of watching television and listening to radio support this economic intuition.74
The traditional tragedy of the commons analogy may be inadequate to capture the market
for something like music in advertising.
To illustrate the tragedy of the commons, economists tell the story of a common
field subject to overgrazing because no owns it and therefore no one has the proper
incentive to maximize its value. And, of course, empirical evidence shows an increase in
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agricultural production in England when common fields were enclosed.75 An advertising
jingle presents a significantly different situation. Unlike the farmer who has limited
options as to where to graze his cattle, the advertiser has thousands of songs to choose
from. A farmer with a thousand choices of equally cheap and desirable fields on which to
graze his cattle would rationally choose not to overgraze any particular one. It would be
pointless and might cost him in the future. Overgrazing in the presence of numerous
choices of fresh fields might even impose a reputational cost. So too with advertisers
choosing music to sell their products. Advertisers have no reason to overgraze when
musical options are plentiful, and, more importantly, when the costs associated with
annoying the public are too high. Overuse of promotional music, as with broadcast music,
would be a bad marketing decision that is unlikely to need regulation.
Outside of the context of background music, the role of consumer choice may also
help explain any absence of overused works. Consider books, which unlike trademarks
and sometimes songs, require an element of consumer choice in their consumption. One
can imagine the public getting tired of encountering a ubiquitous song or getting tricked
by a misused trademark, but it’s difficult to see how the multiplicity of editions of a book
could make the public sick of the story. My Antonia (1918), by Willa Cather, is available
in at least 50 different editions by at least 50 different publishers in many formats (cheap
paperback, trade paper, hard cover, large print, curricular unit, ebook, audio tape and
audio cd) at prices as low as $2 and as high as $108;76 yet, no consumer has to
unwillingly encounter the story or its characters. If a consumer encounters the same song
in the advertising for fifty products, he or she may get tired of hearing it. The song could
75
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not be avoided without turning off the television, switching off the radio, and avoiding
places which broadcast ads, but the consumer of books will never be forced to consume
even a single one of the fifty editions of My Antonia. It is difficult to see a work ever
wearing out in a situation when the public only encounters it when it chooses to.
Consumer choice/avoidance can be an effective form of non-governmental regulation
preventing a work from wearing out.
In order to state general conditions where concerns of overexploitation might be
justified, one must consider the likely private regulation by both producers of works and
consumers of them. Consistent with the findings in this study, we should expect to find
congestion in markets for intangible goods potentially protected by copyright only when
three conditions exist: 1) substitutes for the good are not cheap and plentiful;

2)

additional subsequent uses of the good entail no significant reputational or other costs to
the producer (e.g. by alienating consumers); and 3) consumption of the good by
consumers cannot easily be avoided by them (e.g. some advertising uses).
2. Debased Songs? Debased Anything?
The data analyzed in Part II suggest that public domain musical compositions
appear in movies with about the same frequency as one would predict that similar
copyrighted compositions would appear. This result suggests they have not been debased
in some way by inappropriate uses that render them no longer fit for public
consumption.77 My earlier study of fiction is even more strongly suggestive of a lack of
this sort of congestion. Yet, worry over inappropriate uses debasing works persists.
As noted above, virtually every commentator who takes the possibility of
debasement seriously points to unauthorized uses of fictional characters as his or her
77

See supra Part II.B.2.
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prime example, rather than the making of unauthorized copies of books or songs. The
entire debate seems to turn on the effect of having unauthorized porn movies starring
Mickey Mouse78 or Superman.79 No commentators worried about unauthorized
pornography seem aware of the vast amount of unauthorized “inappropriate” works that
have already been produced. A quick search of the Internet Adult Film Database
(www.iafd.com) reveals six pornographic movies with “Cinderella” in the title, including
Cinderella in Chains and its two sequels, three with Snow White in the title, and a
whopping 19 featuring Santa Claus.80 Searches on the same database of “Apollo” and
“Zeus” turn up numerous examples of gay cinematic achievement. Unauthorized porn fan
fiction also abounds, starring such characters as Harry Potter, Captain Kirk and Mr.
Spock, and Starsky and Hutch.81 Is there a serious argument that Cinderella, Santa,
mythical Greek Gods, Harry Potter, and Star Trek characters are worth less now than
before these works were produced?
Probably not. Consumer and producer self-regulation likely combine to nullify the
potential negative effects of unauthorized uses of fictional characters. Consumers who
would be offended by a porno Mickey will not purchase a movie or read the fan fiction
setting forth his daring new exploits. Those who deliberately seek out the new Mickey
will do so because the porn version enhances Mickey’s value to them, rather than detracts
from it. Movies, books, and images that must be deliberately sought out by consumers are
unlikely to affect negatively the value of the fictional characters portrayed therein.
This observation suggests that the most serious problem might be posed by goods,
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like t-shirts, which cannot be avoided by the public when the wearer strolls down the
street. This danger is probably lessened by the natural reluctance of producers and
distributors to sell offensive material. The GAP is unlikely to start selling a t-shirt
portraying Mickey and Goofy in bed together. In other words, producer self-regulation,
like consumer self-regulation, diminishes the likelihood that serious damage will be done
to an iconic character. The internet, however, provides a venue where the reputation costs
of selling offensive items like t-shirts may be low enough to sustain a market. If the GAP
will not sell the offensive t-shirt, then someone on-line might. An internet purchase might
end up being displayed on the chest of someone walking down the street. We could
potentially encounter an image portraying Mickey and Goofy in compromising
circumstances, despite our best efforts to avoid it.
The number of pedestrians wearing offensive gear, however, is likely to be quite
low. There are reputational costs to the wearer that will deter all but a handful of people
from displaying such goods in public. And more importantly, Disney will employ its
lawyers to prevent the unauthorized sale of its trademarked images.82 Trademark law
provides strong protection against unauthorized uses of franchised fictional characters.
Not all characters function as trademarks, however, so the potential for an offensive
Cinderella or Snow White t-shirt remains a possibility, although the author has never
encountered one.
To generalize conditions from the discussion above, debasement of a work not
protected by copyright would seem unlikely when: 1) Consumers must deliberately seek
out and consume the good;

2) Presenting the good to the consumer entails no
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reputational or other costs to the producer (e.g. by alienating consumers); 3) Public
consumption entails no reputational costs to the consumer; and 4) Consumption is lawful
(e.g. it entails no violation of trademark law, obscenity law or libel). These four
conditions should be met so infrequently that the burden of proving over-exploitation
should be squarely placed on those who claim it is a serious problem worthy of
government intervention in the market.
CONCLUSION
The study of the most popular musical compositions published from 1913-32 as
they appear in movies from 1968-2007 suggests that the film market for public domain
music functions as efficiently as the market for copyrighted music without any special
governmental intervention, such as retroactive copyright term extension. This confirms
similar research conducted on the exploitation of bestselling fiction from the same era.
These studies cannot prove that copyright protection beyond that necessary to stimulate
the creation of a work in the first instance is never necessary, but they suggest that the
over- and under-exploitation hypotheses are over-stated. Surely the time has come to
place the burden of proof on those who predict valuable works in the public domain will
suffer from serious market failure. Legislation should be based on sound empirical
evidence.
In the absence of concrete evidence, we are left with predicting the behavior of
rational actors, which indicates that self-regulation by producers and consumers of public
domain goods will discipline the market. Their likely behavior suggests four conditions
necessary for under-exploitation and four conditions necessary for over-exploitation.
These conditions suggest that any legislative response should be very specifically
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targeted to a very narrow set of works. Blanket term extension to all sorts of works in all
sorts of contexts, with its significant attendant costs, cannot be justified by a handful of
very narrow, and unproven, hypothetical assumptions.
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APPENDIX A

1915

Title
By the Light of the Silvery Moon
Let Me Call You Sweetheart
Alexander's Ragtime Band
It's a Long Way to Tipperary
El Choclo
Danny Boy
You Made Me Love You--I Didn't Want to Do It
St. Louis Blues
Pack Up Your Troubles in Your Old Kitbag and
Smile, Smile, Smile

1916

Colonel Bogey

1917
1918
1920

I Ain't Got Nobody
Poor Butterfly (The Big Show)
Over There
After You've Gone
Avalon
Look for the Silver Lining (Good Morning, Dearie)
Whispering

Year
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913

1914

1921
1922
1923
1924
1925

1926

1927

1928

The Sheik of Araby (Make it Snappy)
Hot Lips
Bugle Call Rag
The Man I Love (Strike Up the Band)
Tea for Two (No, No, Nanette)
Manhattan (Garrick Gaieties)
Rhapsody in Blue
Show Me the Way to Go Home
Sweet Georgia Brown
Yes Sir, That's My Baby
Are You Lonesome Tomight?
Bye Bye Blackbird
La Cumparsita
Someone to Watch Over Me (Oh, Kay!)
The Best Things in Life Are Free (Good News)
Blue Skies
My Blue Heaven
I Can't Give You Anything But Love
I Wanna Be Loved By You (Good Boy)
If I Had You

30

Composer(s)
Edward Madden; Gus Edwards
Beth Whitson; Leo Friedman
Irving Berlin
Jack Judge; Harry Williams
A.G. Villoldo; G.J.S.W.
Frederick E. Weatherly
Joe McCarthy; James V. Monaco
William Christopher Handy
George Asaf; Felix Powell
Kenneth J. Alfred (pseud. of Major F.J.
Ricketts)
Roger Graham; Spencer Williams & Dave
Peyton
John L. Golden; Raymond Hubbell
George Michael Cohan
Henry Creamer & Turner Layton
Al Jolson & Vincent Rose
Bud De Sylva; Jerome Kern
Malvin Schonberger; John Schonberger
Harry B. Smith & Francis Wheeler; Ted
Snyder
Henry Busse, Henry Lange & Lou Davis
Jack Pettis, Billy Meyers & Elmer Schoebel
Ira Gershwin; George Gershwin
Irving Caesar; Vincent Youmans
Lorenz Hart; Richard Rodgers
George Gershwin
Irving King
Ben Bernie, Maceo Pinkard & Kenneth Casey
Gus Kahn; Walter Donaldson
Roy Turk & Lou Handman
Mort Dixon; Ray Henderson
G.H. Matos Rodriquez; Vincenzo Billi
Ira Gershwin; George Gershwin
Bud G. De Sylva, Lew Brown & Ray
Henderson
Irving Berlin
George Whiting; Walter Donaldson
Dorothy Fields; Jimmy McHugh
Bert Kalmar; Herbert Stothart & Harry Ruby
Ted Shapiro, Jimmy Campbell & Reginald
Connelly

1929

1930

1931

1932

Let's Do It (Paris)
Let's Misbehave (Paris)
Makin' Whoopee!
Sweet Lorraine
When You're Smiling--the Whole World Smiles
with You
Ain't Misbehavin' (Hot Chocolates)
Am I Blue?
Bolero
Happy Days Are Here Again
Honeysuckle Rose (Load of Coal)
Singin' in the Rain
Star Dust
You Do Something to Me (Fifty Million
Frenchmen)
Beyond the Blue Horizon
Body and Soul (Three's a Crowd)
Embraceable You (Girl Crazy)
Exactly Like You
Georgia On My Mind
Get Happy
I Got Rhythm (Girl Crazy)
Just a Gigolo
Love for Sale (The New Yorkers)
My Ideal
On the Sunny Side of the Street
Sleepy Lagoon
Three Little Words
You Brought a New Kind of Love to Me
Dancing in the Dark (The Band Wagon)
Dream a Little Dream of Me
I Found a Million Dollar Baby--In a Five and Ten
Cent Store (Billy Rose's Crazy Quilt)
Life is Just a Bowl of Cherries
Minnie, the Moocher--The Ho De 'Ho Song
Mood Indigo
Out of Nowhere
It Don't Mean a Thing
Night and Day
You're Getting to Be a Habit with Me

31

Cole Porter
Cole Porter
Gus Kahn; Walter Donaldson
Mitchell Parish; Cliff Burwell
Mark Fisher, Joe Goodwin & Larry Shay
Andy Razaf; Thomas Waller & Harry Brooks
Grand Clarke; Harry Akst
Maurice Ravel
Jack Yellen; Milton Ager
Andy Razaf; Thomas Waller
Arthur Freed; Nacio Herb Brown
Mitchell Parish; Hoagy Carmichael
Cole Porter
Leo Robin; Richard Whiting & W. Franke
Harling
Edward Heyman, Robert Sour & Frank
Eyton; John W. Green
Ira Gershwin; George Gershwin
Dorothy Fields; Jimmy McHugh
Stuart Gorrell; Hoagy Carmichael
Ted Koehler; Harold Arlen
Ira Gershwin; George Gershwin
Irving Caesar; Leonello Casucci
Cole Porter
Leo Robin; Richard Whiting & Newell Chase
Dorothy Fields; Jimmy McHugh
Jack Lawrence; Eric Coates
Bert Kalmar; Harry Ruby
Sammy Fain, Irving Kahal & Pierre Norman
Howard Dietz; Arthur Schwartz
Gus Kahn; W. Schwandt & F. Andree
Billy Rose & Mort Dixon; Harry Warren
Lew Brown & Ray Henderson
Cab Calloway & Irving Mills
Duke Ellington, Irving Mills & Albany Bigard
Edward Heyman; John W. Green
Irving Mills; Duke Ellington
Cole Porter
Al Dubin; Harry Warren

APPENDIX B
Compiled by Professor Jaxk Reeves and Kun Xu
Statistics Department, University of Georgia
I. DATA SET – THE POPULAR SONGS
A. Description
This set of data consists of 74 songs, composed in 1909-1932, which appeared at
least 4 times in films during 1968-2007. The most popular songs ‘Star Dust’ and ‘La
Cumparsita’ both appeared in film 17 times in our study period. Nineteen of these songs
were published between 1909 and 1922. These 19 songs are all currently in the public
domain, but were not necessarily in the public domain during the entire 40-year period of
this investigation (1968-2007). The other 55 songs were published between 1923 and
1932 are not yet in the public domain. This data set of 74 songs, where K>=4, is used for
most of the analysis, but similarly analysis using thresholds if k>=3,k>=2, and k>=1 are
also included. Table 1 below contains a sample of the data.
Table 1 POPULAR SONGS
SONG

COMPOSITION

PUBYR

EXP

TOT

T1968

T1969

T1970

…

T2006

T2007

1
2
3
4
5
6
…
73
74
total

By the light of the silvery …
Let me call you sweetheart
Alexander's Ragtime Band
It's a long way to Tipperary
El Choclo
Danny Boy
…
Night and Day
You're Getting to Be a …

1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1913
…
1932
1932

1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1988
…
2027
2027

4
4
5
4
6
11
…
13
6
537

0
0
0
0
1
0
…
0
0
4

0
0
0
0
0
0
…
0
0
4

0
0
0
1
0
0
…
0
0
5

……
……
……
……
……
……

0
0
0
0
0
0
…
2
0
20

0
0
0
0
0
0
…
0
0
3

……
……

Oringinal Variables:
SONG:
song number (for reference purpose)
COMPOSITION: name of the song (for reference purpose)
PUBYR:
publication year
TOT:
total appearance time (in film) for that song during 1968-2007
T1968: appears once for that song (in movie) in year 1968
T2007:
appears once for that song (in movie) in year 2007
EXP:
copyright expire time. (where PUBYR ≤ 1922, EXP=PUBYR+75;
and PUBYR>1922, EXP=PUBYR+95)
The last row represents the total appearance of the songs in our list for a certain year
during1968-2007. This ranges from a low of 2 in 1971 to a high of 41 in 1998.
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B. Data Manipulation
As stated in the introduction, the first analysis of the popular songs concerns
“availability” of songs during 1968-2007. Each song was measured at every year from
1968-2007, a total of 40 time points. The 40 variables T1968, T1969, …, T2007 from the
original data were converted into one variable called AFPUB, with the values for AFPUB
being 59,60,…,98 respectively. The modified data set should have 74 x 40=2960
observations. This modified data set is called the song-year version of the popular songs.
Three other variables, YR, MOV, and PD, were also created from the original data set of
N=74 songs and carried over to the new data set of 2960 song-year events. A sample of
the modified data is shown in Table 2 below:
Table 2 POPULAR SONGS (SONG-YEAR)
OBS

SONG

PUBYR

YR

AFPUB

PD

MOV

1
2
3
4
……
409
……
751
……
2956
2960

1
1
1
1
…
11
…
19
…
74
74

1909
1909
1909
1909
…
1916
…
1922
…
1932
1932

1968
1969
1970
1971
…
1976
…
1998
…
2006
2007

59
60
61
62
…
60
…
76
…
74
75

0
0
0
0
…
0
…
1
…
0
0

0
0
0
0
…
1
…
0
…
0
0

Generated Variables:
OBS:
observation number
SONG: song number (same as in the Table 1.)
PUBYR: publication year of the song (same as in the Table 1.)
AFPUB: number of years after publication (as explained above)
YR:
calendar year of measurement (= PUBYR+AFPUB)
MOV: indicator of the appearance of the song (1-appear in that year ; 0-not)
PD:
indicator of the copyright (1 - in the public domain;0 - not in public domain.
Observations where PUBYR ≤ 1922 and AFPUB ≥ 75 are in the public domain.)
II. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULT
Before presenting analysis results, it is necessary to briefly describe the tools and
methodology used in the following analyses. Each of the 4 analyses took the same
general path. First, the data were explored by numerical and graphical summaries. Then,
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more sophisticated analyses followed. Since the response variable in this problem is
dichotomous, logistic regression was applied.
A. Exploratory Data Analysis
1. Preliminary Analysis. As shown in Table 1, the appearance time of each
popular song varies from 4-17 and the total number of appearances is 537(shown in the
last row of Table 1 as variable TOT). In Figure 1, the histogram shows the frequency of
songs appearances. Because no song appears exactly 15 or16 times in the data set, these
two columns don’t show in the chart. The average appearance for each song is about 7
times.
Figure 1. Popular Songs by Number of Appearance (n=74)

Through data manipulation, the appearance of a single song in particular year becomes a
dichotomous variable (MOV),(0 if the song didn’t appear and 1 if it appeared in that
year’s movie).Because there were 64 occasions where the some song appeared in more
than one film during some year the total number of events in the dichotomous data set
was reduced from 537 to 473 unique events. According to Table 2, of the 2960
observations, only 312 are in the public domain and the rest are copyrighted. The
percentage of these two groups are shown in Figure 2 below. The copyrighted
observations are the majority with percentage 89.46%.
Figure 2. Observations by Copyright Status
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Furthermore, consider the total appearance in one year (shown in figure 3 below). By
focusing on the total appearances, illustrated by the green line, one can see an increase
after year 1984 when the songs published in 1909 came to the public domain. The total
appearance also shows a sharp decrease after 1998 when the songs in our study stopped
entering the public domain. At the same time, appearance of copyrighted songs,
illustrated by red line (during the year 1968-1987, the red line overlaps with the green
line), shows a steady increase through the whole time period. Contributions from the
songs in public domain give a linear increase in appearance time after 1984.
Figure.3 Song Appearances by Year and Status
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Figure.4 Appearance Probability by Year and Status (K>=4)
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On the other hand, the total number of observations for songs in public-domain and
copyrighted are not equal. As shown in Figure 2, the proportion of appearance may be
more appropriate to illustrate the effect of copyright effect. Divide the number of
appearance time in any year by the total number of that set for both public-domain and
copyrighted song observations. As shown in the Figure 4, we can see a slight difference
between the copyright statuses. From all above, we can propose a null hypothesis that
there is no significant difference in occurrence probability between the public domain
songs and copyrighted songs, also an alternative hypothesis that the songs in public
domain are more likely to be used in film. To decide which hypothesis is more probable
we must perform further analysis.
According to Figure 3 and Figure 4, we also notice that the value in year 2007 has an
abnormally sharp decrease. We also do the same preliminary analysis on the popular
songs that appear more than 1, 2 and 3 times , those graphs show abnormally sharp
decrease in year 2007 as well. It is reasonable to consider the year 2007 as an outlier in
this study, (which may be caused by incomplete data), so we don’t include observations
in 2007 in our further analysis. In year 2007, no public domain song appeared in the film
and the copyrighted songs appeared only 3 times. After deleting this year for all 74 songs
in 2007, we have a total of 470 appearance including 75 public domain songs and 395
copyrighted songs. The total observation number for all years combined decreases to
74*39= 2886.
2. Popular Songs Analysis 1 (Availability by Song-Year). Results of song-year
analysis of the popular songs are presented in this section. The frequency table of
availability (‘MOV’ rows) versus copyright status (‘PD’,columns) is shown below:
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TABLE 3. MOV*PD FREQUENCY TABLE
Frequency
Col Percent

Public
Domain

Copyrighted

Total

Appear

75
24.04%

395
15.35%

470
16.29%

Not appear

237
75.96%

2179
84.65%

2416
83.71%

Total

312

2574

2886
=74*39

Results from Table 3 show that over the period of analysis, 15.35 % of copyrighted songs
appeared versus 24.04 % of the public domain. Assuming each determination of
availability is independent from others (which is not quite true here), the frequencies
shown above imply that there exists an association between the rows and columns. But is
the association statistically significant? The chi-square test for independence of rows and
columns follows:

= 0.2715+ 2.2403 +1.3959+ 11.5166 =15.4242

The p-value from the chi-square test indicates severe dependency between copyright
status and appearance of songs in the movie. The Fisher exact test for positive association
(upper-tail test for large sample) follows:

Where c = sum of the first column = 312; r = sum of the first row = 470; N= grand sum = 2886
;
75
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The p-value from the Fisher exact test shows that songs in the public domain were used
by movie maker at a significantly higher rate than those which were copyrighted. The
above result is based on the assumption that all observations are independent from others.
It was used to determine if there exists an association to warrant further analyses. Since a
strong dependency exists between copyright status and works’ appearance, we proceed
with further analysis. Of course, the results above are exaggerated to some extent because
each song appeared, on average, about 6 times in the above analysis, and the availability
status for a particular song is surely positively correlated over times. However, even
under the most severe assumption (that observations for a particular book are completely
correlated, so that the sample size is exaggerated by a factor of 6), the χ 2 value obtained
(
) would still lead to a very strong evidence of a public domain effect.
3. Results for Other Thresholds. e results presented above and analyzed in the
bulk of this report concern the dataset when restricted to the n=74 songs which had
appeared in at least 4 films during the 39 years between 1968-2006. This restriction was
made so as to include the songs which were clearly 'popular' over the period. On the other
hand, this is a rather restrictive requirement, since it includes only 74 of the 1294 popular
songs released from 1909-1932, with only 19 of these being current public domain songs.
If the threshold for inclusion were lowered from K>=4 to K>=3, K>=2, or K>=1, many
more songs could be included, but the reliability of results might decrease. Table 4 below
contains summaries of the data which would occur if one used other inclusion thresholds.
The remainder of this report will concentrate on the K>=4 case described in the first row
of Table 4, and discussed heretofore, but results for the other 3 data sets will be presented
at the end of the report.
TABLE 4. SUMMARY OF DATA SETS BASED ON INCLUSION
THRESHOLD(K)
K
>=4

Songs
N EPD CP
74 19 55

>=3

99 23 76

>=2

146 40 106

>=1

259 79 180

All Events
Ev UEv ESY P
537 470 2886
0.1629
612
540
3861
0.1399
706
633
5694
0.1112
819
746
10101
0.0739

PD Events
UEv ESY P
75 312 0.2404

CP Events
UEv ESY P
395
2574
0.1535
76 341 0.2229 464
3520
0.1318
91 552 0.1649 542
5142
0.1054
113
1058 633
9043
0.1068
0.0700

The 'Songs' section of Table 4 categorizes the 'N' songs that meet the threshold
requirement into those that have entered the public domain (EPD) and those that are still
copyright protected (CP). It should be remembered, of course, that the 'EPD' songs were
not 'PD' for the entire period of observation. The next section of the table (All Events)
counts the total number of times that a song is used in a film in the 39-year period from
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1968-2006. This number of events (Ev) is reduced slightly to unique events, (UEv), since
we allow a song to be counted at most once in a given year. Eligible song-years (ESY) is
given by ESY=N*39, since each song is eligible to be in a film for each of the 39 years.
The last column of this section, P, where P=UEv/ESY, is the proportion of songs used in
films. The last two sections, 'PD Events' and 'CP Events', simply subdivide all song-years
and associated events into those which occurred under 'PD' and those which occurred
under 'CP' conditions. For all 4 threshold conditions, it can be noted that 'P' is higher
under the PD conditions than under the CP conditions. One can easily perform Chisquared tests (as was done above in Section III.1.b for the K>=4 dataset) to show that the
differences are significant. One objection to these tests could be that they do not account
for time effects - the 'PD' group has a higher proportion of its songs eligible during the
latter years of the observation period than does the 'CP' group. So, if there is an increase
in utilization rate over time due to factors unrelated to copyright status, the Chi-squared
tests could overstate the importance of the copyright status effect. To investigate this, in
the next section of this report, Logistic Regression models which can control for both
copyright status and time (year) are introduced.
B. Logistic Regression
In analysis 1 (song-year level) of the popular songs, the response variable (MOV)
is dichotomous (0 if the song didn’t appear, and 1 if it appeared in that year’s movie).
Logistic regression is appropriate for modeling this type of response variable.
Using copyright status (PD) alone to model availability (MOV) might omit other
significant factors affecting songs appearance in films. Other variables which could be
included in the model are PUBYR, AFPUB, and YR. All four variables (PD, PUBYR,
AFPUB, and YR) are possible explanatory variables for CPUB. Since copyright status is
the explanatory variable of primary interest, it was the first variable included in the
model. Care needs to be taken when choosing additional variables to include in the model
to avoid confounding effects since some of these variables are function of others. For
example, copyright status (PD) depends solely on publication year (PUBYR) and age of
the work (AFPUB), and the calendar year of the measurement (YR) is the sum of
publication year (PUBYR) and age of the work (AFPUB). According to our data, the year
1984 is a key point to the observation, because the songs in our study start to fall in
public-domain in that year. We make a new variable PY84, defined as PY84=YR-1984,
Since period is another effect of interest and PY84 was not too highly correlated with PD,
it was included in the model (Figure 3 shows a increase in total appearance after year
1984). Including either PUBYR or AFPUB in this model (along with PD and PY84) will
cause some confounding, so we did not attempt this.
Of course, just because appearance is more likely for PD than CP events, doesn't prove
that PD is significantly different higher than CP. The main confounder is year, since there
were many more PD eligible during later years, and there seems to be a strong year
effect. To investigatethis, we considered a 7-level hierarchy of linear models:
ln(P/Q) = B0

[Model 0}
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ln(P/Q) = B0 + B1*PD
[Model 1] {PD only}
ln(P/Q) = B0 +
+ B2*PY84
[Model 1L] Linear in PY84
ln(P/Q) = B0 +
+ a(grp)
[Model 1G] grouped year
ln(P/Q) = B0 + B1*PD + B2*PY84
[Model 2L] {Linear,Additive}
ln(P/Q) = B0 + B1*PD + a(grp)
[Model 2G] {grouped,Additive}
ln(P/Q) = B0 + B1*PD + B2*PY84 + B3*PD*PY84 [Model 3L]
{Linear,Interaction}

In fact, Models IL and 1G are similar in all cases, since the trend is close to linear. (The
grouped method uses 5 blocks of 8 years, but similar results were found with 10 blocks of
4.) The real question concerns whether the B1 coefficient in model 2L (or 2G) is
significantly different from zero, or whether it can be thrown out, reducing to Model 1L
(or 1G). It turns out that in every case, the answer is 'not significant'; there is no effect of
PD/CP on appearance, once one controls for year effect. The fit for selected models for
K>=4 is shown in the Table below.
TABLE 5. Summary of 7 Hierarchical models for (K>= 4) Dataset
Model
B0
B1
B2
B3 -2lnL AIC SBC
------------------------------------------------------------0
-1.6371
.
.
.
2565 2567 2573
------------------------------------------------------------1
-1.7077 +0.5571
.
.
2551 2555 2567
------------------------------------------------------------1L -1.9642 .
+0.0598
.
2405 2409 2421*
------------------------------------------------------------1G -1.7840 .
[GRP 5] .
2398 2408* 2437
------------------------------------------------------------2L -1.9602 -0.0534 +0.0603
.
2405 2411 2429
------------------------------------------------------------2G -1.7708 -0.0530 [GRP 5] .
2398 2410 2446
------------------------------------------------------------3L -1.9704 +0.4635 +0.0618 -0.0365 2403 2411 2435
-------------------------------------------------------------

Based on the AIC or BIC we can either pick the model with continuous year effect or the
grouped year effect as our final model. Both of the models have the same interpretation
of the data, which is that the probability of the songs appearing in the film increase over
time, but there is no effect due to PD/CP.
We also do the same analysis on other threshold and the result shows the same trend on
the data set. The crucial results come from the analyses of Model 2L for each data set. In
each case, the P-value for the ‘PD’ effect (‘B1’ in the model) is not statistically
significantly different from zero, as shown in Table 6 below. Thus, after accounting for
the increase in appearance rates over time, there is no evidence of a positive or negative
effect on appearance probability due to being in public domain or not. This holds for all 4
data sets.
Table 6. Parameter Estimates of B1 for 2L Models
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2-tailed
DataSet B1-estimate SE(B1) z-stat P-value
K>=4
-0.0534 .1504 -0.355 .7241
K>=3 +0.0328 .1505 +0.218 .8277
K>=2
-0.0854 .1304 -0.655 .5120
K>=1
-0.1171 .1145 -1.022 .3067
III. CONCLUSIONS
A naïve analysis of the data (the chi-squared & fisher’s test of section IV. 1)
demonstrated a clear difference in availability of books between copyrighted and public
domain works, with public domain works being significantly more appearance in film. A
serious objection to this analysis is that it controlled for neither period effects nor for
popularity of books considered. After the logistic regression analysis to control for timeperiod effects, we find that the copyright status plays no significant role in affecting the
probability of a song’s appearance in a film.
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APPENDIX C

Title

Author

Pub
Yr

60

65

70

75/PD

80/PD

85/PD

2006 status

Pollyanna

Porter, Eleanor

1913

0

0

0

5

4

10

30 print/5 ebooks

O Pioneers!

Cather, Willa

1913

2

1

0

3

8

13

38 print/5 ebooks

Sons and Lovers

Lawrence, D.H.

1913

3

5

5

7

10

14

24 print/7 ebooks

Dubliners

Joyce, James

1914

2

2

4

2

10

11

24 print/5 ebooks

Tarzan of the Apes

Burroughs, Edgar

1914

2

2

3

3

5

10

39 print/6 ebooks

Of Human Bondage

Maugham, Somerset

1915

6

5

5

3

6

11

18 print/3 ebooks

The Song of the Lark

Cather, Willa

1915

1

1

2

3

5

10

17 print/2 ebooks

The Lone Star Ranger

Grey, Zane

1915

0

1

2

2

4

4

18 print/4 ebooks
34 print/4 ebooks

A Portrait of the Artist

Joyce, James

1916

3

3

6

4

12

15

The Magnificent Ambersons

Tarkington, Booth

1918

3

1

3

2

3

7

18

My Antonia

Cather, Willa

1918

2

1

4

4

18

42

50 print/3 ebooks

Winesburg, Ohio

Anderson, Sherwood

1919

2

1

2

6

12

26

29 print/5 ebooks

This Side of Paradise

Fitzgerald, F. Scott

1920

2

1

3

6

12

23

24 print/6 ebooks

Main Street

Lewis, Sinclair

1920

2

3

3

8

11

27

27 print/6 ebooks

The Age of Innocence

Wharton, Edith

1920

1

2

3

12

15

35

35 print/7 ebooks

Scaramouche

Sabatini, Raphael

1921

0

1

1

5

3

18

18

Babbit

Lewis, Sinclair

1922

2

3

4

10

12

The Beautiful and the Damned

Fitzgerald, F. Scott

1922

1

2

2

2

11

18

Captain Blood

Sabatini, Raphael

1922

0

0

0

2

8

22

Ulysses

Joyce, James

1922

4

5

6

8

Totals for 20 books

38

40

58

93

181

268

19 print/3 ebooks
532 print/97
ebooks

Ave. Publ/Ed Per Print Book

1.9

2

2.9

4.7

9

13.4

26.6

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Paul J. Heald
Visiting Professor, University of Chicago Law School
Allen Post Professor of Law, University of Georgia
University of Georgia School of Law
Herty Drive
Athens, Georgia 30602
heald@uga.edu
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